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Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher minimum wages may lead to greater levels of 
employment under perfect competition.  We demonstrate this possibility in a simple general-
equilibrium model with two goods produced by two factors and consumed by two representative 
households.  Within our model, hiking a minimum wage redistributes income between 
heterogeneous consumers.  This redistribution may create an excess demand for the labor-
intensive good, and hence increase employment to restore equilibrium, despite the fact that every 
firm becomes less labor intensive.   
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1. Introduction 
       As we show within a simple general-equilibrium model of perfect competition, higher 
minimum wages may paradoxically lead to greater levels of employment.  Such a paradox has 
previously been associated with departures from perfectly competitive behavior. For example, 
the pioneering article by Stigler (1946) includes a monopsonist in the labor market, Manning 
(1995) has firms setting wages to affect effort, and Flinn (2006) considers wage bargaining with 
search-and-matching frictions.  In contrast to these studies, the present paper assumes that firms 
take wages as given, in the way usually associated with perfect competition. 
       Intuitively, a hike in the minimum wage has two effects.  First, each firm reduces its labor 
intensity.  Second, income is redistributed between heterogeneous individuals, possibly 
increasing the relative demand for the labor-intensive good.  If this second (demand-side) effect 
outweighs the first (supply-side) effect, the resulting excess demand for the labor-intensive good 
requires an increase in employment to restore equilibrium.  While the standard partial-
equilibrium treatment of minimum-wage hikes focuses only on the supply-side effect, our 
general-equilibrium approach demonstrates the importance of including also the demand-side 
effect. 
       A similar intuition is suggested by Brecher and Gross (2014) in a representative-consumer 
framework with optimal saving and endogenous growth.  However, the present analysis uses a 
much simpler static model, while adding a second household with different preferences. 
       Our proofs are straightforward, because they liberally invoke a number of well-known 
theorems in the theory of international trade.  For this reason, we start by adopting a standard 
open-economy framework in section 2.  However, as section 3 explains, this framework and its  
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implications can be easily reinterpreted as applying to a closed economy, under some innocuous 
restrictions.  The concluding Section 4 summarizes our main contribution. 
2. Open Economy 
       Consider a large open economy that uses capital and labor to produce goods 1 and 2 under 
constant returns to scale, with production functions that are strictly quasi-concave and satisfy the 
Inada conditions.  Each input is perfectly mobile domestically, but completely immobile 
internationally.  The first good uses a higher capital/labor ratio than the second at any common 
set of wage and rental rates (for labor and capital, respectively).  Firms maximize profits, and 
production remains diversified.  Consumers maximize utility, and their preferences can be 
represented by a well-behaved set of community indifference curves.  Perfect competition 
prevails.   
     For any given amounts of capital and labor used in the country as a whole, we can follow 
Kemp (1969, pp. 61-62) to derive functions 1( )Z p  and 2(1/ )Z p  that denote the economy’s 
excess demands for goods 1 and 2, whose relative prices are p  and 1/p , respectively.  As he 
shows, there exists a p  such that 1 2( ) 0 (1/ )Z p Z p
> >
< <
= =  as p p
<
>
=  .  Thus, p  is the equilibrium 
value of p  when the country is in a state of autarky.       
       This home country trades goods (but not factors) freely with a foreign country, which has 
excess demands *1 ( )Z p
*  and *2 (1/ )Z p
*  as well as autarkic price ratio *p , where asterisks 
indicate foreign counterparts of home symbols.  For the sake of concreteness, suppose that 
*p p<  , indicating that the foreign (home) country has a comparative advantage in the first 
(second) good.  In free trade, * *p p p p< = <  , and world markets are in equilibrium when 
1 1( ) ( ) 0Z p Z p
*+ =  (implying that 2 2 0Z Z
*+ =  by Walras’ Law).     
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       Such an equilibrium is stable in the Walrasian sense if and only if 1 1( ) / 0d Z Z dp
*+ < , so 
that a rise in the relative price of good 1 causes this good to have an excess world supply, which 
pushes the price back down to its initial level.  Since the home country imports good 1 and 
exports good 2 (in accordance with comparative advantage), the necessary and sufficient 
condition for stability is the well-known Marshall-Lerner condition that 1 2 1e e
*+ > ; where 
1 1 1( / ) /e Z p p Z≡ − ∂ ∂  and 2 2 2[ / (1/ )](1/ ) /e Z p p Z
* * *≡ − ∂ ∂ , which denote the price elasticities of 
import demand at home and abroad, respectively. 
       For given factor-use totals in each country, the ZZ curve in Figure 1 shows the relationship 
between p  and 1 1Z Z
*+ , which represents the world excess demand for good 1.  (Where this 
sum is negative, the world has a positive excess supply of the first good.)  The lower (upper) tail 
of this curve lies entirely to the right (left) of the vertical axis, because 1Z  and 1Z
*  are both 
greater (less) than zero for all values of *p p p< <   ( *p p p> >  ).  In the case illustrated, there 
are three possible equilibria, given by points A, B and C.  Clearly, points A and C are stable 
equilibria, whereas point B is unstable. 
       Although simplicity of exposition is commonly assured by assuming that equilibrium is 
unique and hence stable, Bahmani, Harvey and Hegerty (2013) argue that there is no compelling 
empirical evidence in support of the Marshall-Lerner condition for stability.  Moreover, this 
condition may fail to hold if the marginal propensity to consume each good is higher for the 
exporting country than for the importing one, in accordance with the analysis of Johnson (1956). 
        Corresponding to each of the three equilibria in Figure 1, there is not only a unique value of 
p  but also a corresponding value of w , which denotes the home country’s real wage in terms of 
good 2.  This fact follows immediately from Samuelson’s (1949) one-to-one correspondence 
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between product prices and factor returns.  Furthermore, since good 2 is relatively intensive in 
labor, w  successively rises with 1/ p  as we go from point A to B to C, according to the Stolper-
Samuelson (1941) Theorem. 
       Now consider an arbitrary increase in total employment of labor in the home country.  This 
increase raises the value of 1Z  at each p , as Kemp (1969, pp. 104-111) shows using the 
Rybczynski (1955) Theorem, under the assumption that good 1 is normal. Consequently, the ZZ 
curve in Figure 1 shifts rightward to become Z′Z′—thereby shifting equilibrium points A, B and 
C to A′, B′ and C′, respectively.  Corresponding to these six equilibria are the same-lettered 
points in Figure 2, where L denotes home employment.  By continuously increasing and 
decreasing L, we trace out the rest of the DD schedule in Figure 2.  This schedule, with its 
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reverse-S shape, can be described as a “backward-bending” labor-demand curve of the general-
equilibrium (versus Marshallian) type. 
 
       First suppose that the real wage is perfectly flexible.  In this case, home labor remains fully 
employed at its fixed endowment level, represented by point N″ in Figure 2 .  Thus, there is a 
unique equilibrium at point A″, where the demand curve DD intersects the vertical supply curve 
SN″.        
       Next, impose a minimum wage, represented by point E in Figure 2.  The supply curve for 
labor then becomes OEFS, which intersects the demand curve at point A, the new equilibrium.   
Thus, total employment falls from point N″ to N.  Further increases in the real wage lead first to 
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additional declines in employment along the demand curve (until point G), but then to increases 
(until point H), and eventually to more decreases.  Note that even on the backward-bending 
portion of the demand curve for labor, the minimum-wage equilibrium is unique and stable, in 
accordance with Brecher’s (1974) offer-curve analysis.  Thus, although imposing a (binding) 
minimum-wage constraint creates unemployment, tightening this constraint may paradoxically 
restore some of the lost jobs.  Notably, this paradox does not rely on any type of departure from 
perfect competition. 
3. Closed Economy 
       The above analysis can be easily reinterpreted as applying to a single country in the absence 
of international trade.  For this reinterpretation, assume no international differences in 
technology.  Also assume that the foreign country is endowed with capital and skilled labor, of 
which each unit is a perfect substitute for α  units of home (unskilled) labor, where 1α >  .  
Thus, by Samuelson’s (1949) factor-price equalization theorem, the equilibrium wage of skilled 
(foreign) labor is wα , and both countries have the same rental rate of capital.     
       Now let the two countries merge into a single closed economy.  This merger has no impact 
on the equilibrium value of any variable, by Mundell’s (1957) reasoning.  (Skilled labor remains 
fully employed, because it is not subject to the minimum wage.)  Thus, our above analysis in 
Figures 1 and 2 is unchanged.  Specifically, hiking the minimum wage may increase the 
employment of (unskilled) labor. 
       There are other ways to obtain this result in a closed economy, without introducing skilled 
labor.  For example, we could assume that one representative household supplies only labor, 
while the other (with different tastes) owns all of the capital, as discussed by Johnson (1959) and 
Kenen (1959) for the flexible-wage full-employment case.  Alternatively, each household could 
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be assumed to supply both labor and capital, and have an unemployment rate equal to the 
economy’s average.  Under either of these two alternative sets of assumptions, our analysis in 
Figures 1 and 2 would remain qualitatively unchanged. 
4. Conclusion 
       As this paper shows, hiking the minimum wage can paradoxically lead to gains in 
employment under perfect competition, if the demand-side (income-redistribution) effect 
outweighs the supply-side (labor-substitution) effect.  Within our general-equilibrium model, this 
outcome is possible because of a factor-intensity difference between industries and a taste 
difference between consumers.  Based on these plausible differences, the present paradox is a 
theoretically interesting possibility.  It is also in consonance with controversial empirical 
findings of Card and Krueger (1995), who challenge the conventional partial-equilibrium 
presumption that minimum-wage hikes depress employment. 
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